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ADM Partnership v. Martin: 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held in ADM 
Partnership v. Martin, 348 Md. 84, 
702 A.2d 730 (1997) that the 
subjective belief of an employee 
that her neglect to assume a risk 
inherent to her described job 
duties would result in negative 
consequences does not create a 
genuine dispute regarding the 
doctrine of assumption of risk. 
The court concluded that the 
"voluntariness" factor, inherent in 
the doctrine of assumption of risk, 
could not be negated by an 
employee who was instructed to 
carry out the performance of work 
duties, regardless of the 
employee's fear that refusal to do 
so would result in the loss of her 
position or adverse economic 
repercussions for her employer. 
On March 8, 1989, Keen 
Tykenko Martin ("Martin"), a 
delivery person for Ideal 
Reprographics, Inc., was 
instructed to deliver blueprints to a 
property owned by ADM 
Partnership ("ADM"). Upon 
arriving at her destination, Martin 
observed that ice and snow 
covered the majority of the parking 
lot and walkways surrounding the 
building. After observing footprints 
indicating that others had 
traversed over the same ground, 
Martin concluded that she, too, 
could travel safely to and from the 
business' entrance. As Martin 
proceeded around her vehicle in 
order to remove the blueprints 
from the passenger side, she 
slipped but avoided injury by 
grabbing onto her automobile. 
She then continued her task and 
delivered the prints successfully. 
However, upon leaving, Ms. Martin 
SUBJECTIVE BELIEF 
OF EMPLOY~E THAT 
NEGLECT TO ASSUME 
RISK INHERENT TO 
JOB DUTIES WOULD 







By Ruth-Ann E. Lane 
fell, severely injuring her lower 
back. 
The Circuit Court for 
Montgomery County granted 
ADM's motion for judgment at the 
conclusion of plaintiffs case, 
finding that the evidence 
sufficiently established that Martin 
had voluntarily assumed a risk of 
injury when she chose to cross the 
slippery sidewalk. The court of 
special appeals reversed, stating 
that Martin's belief that she would 
have encountered negative 
conseque~ces if she failed to fulfill 
her job requirements presented a 
factual issue as to whether her 
actions were voluntary and, 
therefore, was a question for jury 
determination. 
Certiorari was granted and the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
began its analysis by reviewing the 
standard for the assumption of risk 
doctrine in Maryland. ADM 
Partnership, 348 Md. at 90, 702 
A.2d at 734. The court recognized 
that assumption of risk requires 
the defendant to prove that the 
plaintiff: "(1) had knowledge of the 
risk of danger; (2) appreciated that 
risk; and (3) voluntarily confronted 
the risk of danger." Id. at 91, 702 
A.2d at 734 (citing Uscombe v. 
Potomac Edison Co., 303 Md. 619, 
630, 495 A.2d 838 (1985». 
Further, the court noted that 
assumption of risk results in the 
plaintiff relieving the defendant of 
his duty of care. Id. (quoting 
Rogers v. Frush, 257 Md. 233, 
243, 262 A.2d 549, 554 (1970». 
Finally, the court applied an 
objective test, stating that when a 
reasonable person would have 
clearly understood an obvious risk 
presented by the individual 
circumstances, the issue becomes 
one of a matter of law. Id. at 91-2, 
702 A.2d at 734 (citing Schroyer v. 
McNeal, 323 Md. 275, 283-8, 592 
A.2d 1119, 1123 (1991». The 
court concluded, "'there are certain 
risks which anyone of adult age 
must be taken to appreciate: the 
danger of slipping on ice, of falling I 
through unguarded openings, of 
lifting heavy objects. . . and 
doubtless many others. III Id. at 92, 
702 A.2d at 734 (quoting Prosser 
and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 
§68 at 488 (5th ed. 1984)}. 
In continuing its discussion, the 
court emphasized that the 
rationale of the intermediate court 
relied upon the determination that 
an employee's job requirement to 
complete a specified task 
necessarily controls the issue of 
voluntarism; thus, Martin had been 
deprived of chOOSing whether to 
act or not to act through no fault of 
her own. Id. at 95, 702 A.2d at 
736. The court of appeals noted 
"the intermediate appellate court 
then proceeded to draw the 
conclusion that '. . . one might 
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reasonably infer that Martin, with 
no clear and reasonable 
alternative, was compelled to use 
the walkway in order to complete 
the delivery for her employer.'" Id. 
702 A.2d at 735 (quoting Martin v. 
ADM Partnership, Inc., 106 
Md.App. 652, 665, 666 A.2d at 883 
(1995». The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, however, evaluated the 
case law presented by the parties 
at trial as contrary to the decision 
of the court of special appeals and 
found the analysis of the lower 
court flawed. 
The court of appeals previously 
held that where a plaintiff makes 
an informed choice and is fully 
aware of the dangerous conditions 
of certain premises, the plaintiff is 
barred from recovery based on the 
doctrine of assumption of risk. Id. 
(quoting Schroyer, 323 Md. at 288-
89, 592 A.2d at 1125-26). The 
plaintiff in Schroyer was a guest at 
a hotel where the front entrance to 
the lodging had been cleared of ice 
and snow. Id. at 97, 702 A.2d at 
737. Schroyer, however, 
voluntarily chose to park her 
automobile in an area more 
convenient to her hotel room that 
had not been shoveled. Id. After 
safely completing one trip from her 
vehicle to her hotel room, she 
slipped and fell during a second 
attempt. Id. The court refuted the 
intermediate court's application of 
Schroyer to the instant case, 
stating that no evidence existed in 
the previous Martin decision to 
indicate that plaintiff's employment 
was adversely affected. Id. What 
is more, the court of appeals 
distinguished Schroyer further, 
noting that due to plaintiffs 
knowledge of the existing icy 
condition of the sidewalk, she 
voluntarily chose to encounter the 
risk. Id. The Schroyer tribunal, 
the court of appeals continued, 
was not able to reach the 
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voluntariness issue because 
plaintiff was barred from recovery 
based on the facts presented: 
"[t]here simply was no evidence, in 
that case, to suggest that the 
plaintiff's employment was 
adversely affected and, therefore, 
we did not address that issue." Id. 
at 98,702 A.2d at 737. 
Moreover, the court of appeals 
rejected the lower court's 
application of Burke v. Williams, 
244 Md. 154, 223 A.2d 187 
(1966». Id. The court of special 
appeals attempted to apply Burke 
to the case at bar to determine at 
what point the performance of 
employment responsibilities 
becomes a voluntary act. Id. In 
Burke, the plaintiff, a deliveryman, 
suffered injury when he slipped 
and fell off two footboards, landing 
in an excavation. Id. at 95, 702 
A.2d at 736. Although he had 
safely completed other trips at that 
location prior to his accident, it was 
argued by the plaintiff that due to 
limited routes into the work area, 
the nature of the employment, and 
Burke's trepidation regarding a 
loss of income if he failed to 
deliver the sink tops, he did not 
voluntarily assume the risk. Id. at 
95-6,702 A.2d at 736-37 (quoting 
Burke, 244 Md. at 158, 223 A.2d at 
189). The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland remarked that this 
argument ultimately did not apply 
to the Martin scenario because the 
only holding in Burke was that 
"there was no evidence to show 
that plaintiff was not acting on his 
own volition or free will, or that his 
employment would have been in 
jeopardy had he refused to use the 
walkway to make the delivery." Id. 
at 98,702 A.2d at 737-38. 
Additionally, the court found 
error in that the evidence proffered 
at trial by plaintiff did not support a 
conclusion that ADM placed Martin 
in a position of having no choice 
but to use the snow and ice-
covered walkway. Id. 702 A.2d at 
738. Also, neither Martin's 
employer nor ADM ever insisted 
that she use the sidewalk against 
her will, despite her testimony that 
she held a subjective belief that 
she would be terminated had she 
failed to do so. Id. 
Lastly, the court was not 
persuaded by plaintiffs argument 
that ADM breached their tort-
based duty to Ms. Martin. Id. at 
100, 702 A.2d at 739. Martin 
presented the reasoning that 
where a defendant has a duty to a 
plaintiff to make conditions of their 
relationship safer than they 
appear, coercion may emanate 
from sources other than the 
defendant, thereby negating the 
application of the doctrine of 
assumption of risk. Id. The court 
concluded, nevertheless, that 
Martin failed to establish that the 
alleged breach of the duty owed 
her may have been responsible for 
the coercive element inflicted upon 
her; therefore, the necessary 
factor of volition could not be 
discarded when applying the 
doctrine to the case at hand. Id. 
Chief Judge Bell, writing for the 
majority in ADM Partnership v. 
Martin, reaffirmed the necessary 
factors inherent to the application 
of the doctrine of assumption of 
risk. In finding error in the decision 
of the court of special appeals, the 
court managed to focus its opinion 
upon the original issue of 
"voluntariness," and held that an 
employee's subjective belief that 
failure to fulfill an employment 
responsibility is not sufficient to 
establish liability on the part of the 
defendant. This analysis by the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
negates any subjective aspect 
regarding the application of the 
doctrine of assumption of risk. In 
emphasizing the test as an 
objective one, the court 
established the doctrine as a 
matter of law, not of fact, and 
suitable for judicial determination. 
As a result, plaintiffs are precluded 
from relying on their own emotional 
pleas to establish a persuasive 
argument regarding assumption of 
risk and, therefore, from presenting 
evidence that may have influenced 
their decision making process. 
Thus, determination of liability is 
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